# 機制設計

## 步驟

• 定義是次機制設計嘅目的，想要引誘人做出乜行為；
• 由每個個體嘅角度出發，用博弈論思考嗰個個體嘅效益（utility）函數係乜樣，當中可以涉及行為經濟學嘅考量（例：${\displaystyle v=a_{i}(v_{i}+\lambda s)}$ ${\displaystyle v}$  代表個人做理想行為會得到嘅滿足感，${\displaystyle v_{i}}$ ${\displaystyle s}$  等代表已知會影響滿足感嘅因素），得出一個描述個體行為嘅數學模型
• 運用微積分等嘅數學技術，計吓柞因素（${\displaystyle v_{i}}$ ${\displaystyle s}$  等）要設成乜數值，先可以令個人做出理想行為嘅機率最大化（${\displaystyle v}$ ，假設 ${\displaystyle v}$  最大化等如個人會做理想行為嘅機率都最大化）－如果柞因素係政策制定者有權力控制嘅，噉就可以得出一個「要採取乜行動」嘅具體計劃。

## 參考文獻

• Clarke, Edward H. (1971). "Multipart Pricing of Public Goods" (PDF). Public Choice. 11 (1): 17–33. doi:10.1007/BF01726210. JSTOR 30022651.
• Gibbard, Allan (1973). "Manipulation of voting schemes: A general result" (PDF). Econometrica. 41 (4): 587–601. doi:10.2307/1914083. JSTOR 1914083.
• Groves, Theodore (1973). "Incentives in Teams" (PDF). Econometrica. 41 (4): 617–631. doi:10.2307/1914085. JSTOR 1914085.
• Harsanyi, John C. (1967). "Games with incomplete information played by "Bayesian" players, I-III. part I. The Basic Model". Management Science. 14 (3): 159–182. doi:10.1287/mnsc.14.3.159. JSTOR 2628393.
• Mirrlees, J. A. (1971). "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation". Review of Economic Studies. 38 (2): 175–208. doi:10.2307/2296779. JSTOR 2296779.
• Myerson, Roger B.; Satterthwaite, Mark A. (1983). "Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading". Journal of Economic Theory. 29 (2): 265–281. doi:10.1016/0022-0531(83)90048-0.
• Satterthwaite, Mark Allen (1975). "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions". Journal of Economic Theory. 10 (2): 187–217. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.471.9842. doi:10.1016/0022-0531(75)90050-2.
• Vickrey, William (1961). "Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders" (PDF). The Journal of Finance. 16 (1): 8–37.

## 攷

1. Abdulkadiroğlu, A., & Sönmez, T. (2003). School choice: A mechanism design approach. American economic review, 93(3), 729-747.
2. Yang, D., Xue, G., Fang, X., & Tang, J. (2012, August). Crowdsourcing to smartphones: Incentive mechanism design for mobile phone sensing. In Proceedings of the 18th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking (pp. 173-184). ACM.
3. Bowles, S., & Hwang, S. H. (2008). Social preferences and public economics: Mechanism design when social preferences depend on incentives. Journal of Public Economics, 92(8-9), 1811-1820.

## 拎

• Eric Maskin, "Nobel Prize Lecture" delivered on 8 December 2007 at Aula Magna, Stockholm University.