唔啦更謬論

一種非形式謬論

唔啦更謬論粵拼:m4 laa1 gaang1 mau6 leon6英文fallacies of relevance拉丁文ignoratio elenchi)係一種非形式謬論,又叫分散注意謬論(fallacies of distraction),指講緊謬論嗰個人個論證未必係唔合理或者唔真確,但係實際上根本冇處理到講嗰個人處理緊嘅問題[2][3]。唔啦更謬論有分好多種,其中一種比較常見嘅係草人謬論(Straw man fallacy),指一個人攻擊一個佢對手根本冇提出過嘅立場,但係跟手就扮到好似打敗對手噉,例如係以下呢場對話入面嘅 B 君噉:

古羅馬阿里士多德像;阿里士多德係古希臘好出名嘅一個哲學家,亦都係人類史上第一個有系統噉分析謬論嘅人,佢都有對唔啦更謬論作出討論[1]
A 君:我信理神論嘅,即係話我信上帝,但係我唔信宗教。(對手提出咗個立場)
B 君:超,你噉講即係話人類唔使要道德啦,隨街殺人放火強姦都得喇喎?你個立場根本就係錯嘅!(將對手個立場曲解做第個易駁嘅立場)
A 君:我都冇噉講過,我淨係話我唔信宗教之嘛。你喺度曲解緊我講嘅嘢。

喺上面呢場對話當中,B 君攻擊緊一個對手冇主張過嘅立場:宗教同道德之間冇必然關係-有大把信教嘅人啲行為都好唔道德,世界上亦都有好多好有品德嘅無神論者不可知論者、或者理神論者,所以 A 君提倡唔信宗教唔等如主張唔使要道德。亦即係話 B 君講嘅嘢雖然有道理(人類需要道德),但係根本冇應對到佢對手真係講緊嘅立場,所以犯咗一個唔啦更謬論。

啲人之所以會犯唔啦更謬論有好多原因,有啲人可能係唔覺意,但係又有啲人係因為唔夠人詏所以專登用呢類手法詐詐諦引開注意力。

個名點嚟 編輯

  • 拉丁文「ignoratio elenchi」係「唔理一個反駁」噉解,指緊講謬論嗰個人忽略對手個立場掛住講題外話呢種行為。呢個詞係局部源自希臘文「ἔλεγχος」(羅馬字:elenchos)嘅-「ἔλεγχος」意思係「一個反駁嘅論證」噉解[4]
  • 亦都有啲學者對於點將呢個詞譯做現代語言有第啲見解,例如澳洲哲學家 Hamblin 主張將呢個字譯做「對反駁嘅誤解」[5],而有第啲學者覺得應該將呢個字譯做「唔啦更嘅結論[5][6]

概論 編輯

阿里士多德嘅見解 編輯

阿里士多德係人類史上第一個詳細噉分析謬論嘅人,而佢有喺佢嗰本《工具論》(希臘文:Ὄργανον;羅馬字:Organon)嗰度討論過 Ignoratio elenchi 呢一個謬論類型。阿里士多德指出廣義上嚟講,查實世界上嘅謬論冚唪唥都可以當做唔同種嘅 Ignoratio elenchi [7][8]。現代哲學家 Arthur Ernest Davie 喺佢嗰本邏輯學教科書《A Text-Book of Logic》(「一本邏輯教科書」)講謬論嗰個章節入面噉樣描述阿里士多德個睇法:

原版英文:Ignoratio Elenchi, according to Aristotle, is a fallacy which arises from "ignorance of the nature of refutation". In order to refute an assertion, Aristotle says we must prove its contradictory; the proof, consequently, of a proposition which stood in any other relation than that to the original, would be an ignoratio elenchi. Since Aristotle, the scope of the fallacy has been extended to include all cases of proving the wrong point… "I am required to prove a certain conclusion; I prove, not that, but one which is likely to be mistaken for it; in that lies the fallacy… The nature of the fallacy, then, consists in substituting for a certain issue another which is more or less closely related to it, and arguing the substituted issue. The fallacy does not take into account whether the arguments do or do not really support the substituted issue… It is a particularly prevalent and subtle fallacy and it assumes a great variety of forms.[9]
廣東話翻譯:根據阿里士多德,Ignoratio Elenchi 係一種源於「對反駁嘅本質無知」嘅謬論。阿里士多德話,如果我哋要反駁一個主張,噉我哋實要證明嗰個主張係(同自身或者同一啲已經知道係啱嘅命題)矛盾,所以(喺嘗試反駁人哋嘅立場嗰陣)證明一句唔能夠指出呢樣嘢嘅命題就係一個 Ignoratio Elenchi。自從阿里士多德嗰陣開始,謬論(呢個概念)就擴展到包含嗮所有證明咗一個唔關事論點嘅個案。...「我俾人要求我證明某一個結論,我證明咗第個結論,但係呢個結論望落有啲似我真正應該證明嗰個」;個謬論就嗰度... 所以呢個謬論嘅本質係(講緊謬論嗰個人)喺度將真係討論緊嗰個話題換做第啲有關(但係唔同)嘅話題,再喺度詏第個話題。呢個謬論唔會考慮到佢望緊嘅論證係咪真係支持或者反對俾佢換走咗嗰個話題... 佢係一個零舍常見同容易走漏眼嘅謬論,而且有好多型態。

型態 編輯

唔啦更謬論係有分好多種,但係佢哋都有一個共通點:講緊謬論嗰個人喺度嘗試作出一啲主張,但係諗深一層就會知道,佢嘅理據根本就唔能夠合理噉證明佢個主張係啱嘅,所以個「理據」實際上根本「唔啦更」[10][11]。頭先提到嘅草人謬論就係一個例子,而除咗草人謬論之外:

訴諸傳統

訴諸傳統(Appeal to tradition)係指緊一個人純粹因為一個諗法係既有嘅傳統而主張佢係真確合理嘅[12],好似係以下呢場討論噉:

A 君:我認為新教嘅信念係真確嘅,因為教會信呢個諗法信咗好耐喇。
B 君:噉又點呢?歷史說明咗,有好多舊嘅諗法都係錯嘅。例如中世紀嗰陣嘅羅馬天主教會主張話地球宇宙嘅中心,仲為咗要維持佢哋嘅聲望而迫害伽利略,但係後來嘅科學研究清楚噉證明咗教會係錯嘅。所以「教會信呢個諗法信咗好耐」都唔等如呢個信念係真確嘅。

又或者...

A 君:我認為新教嘅信念係真確嘅,因為教會信呢個諗法信咗好耐喇。
B 君:噉又點呢?如果舊啲嘅觀念就一定係啱嘅話,點解你唔改信佛教釋迦牟尼耶穌成 500 幾年喎。
訴諸新穎

訴諸新穎(Appeal to novelty)可以話係訴諸傳統嘅相反,即係主張一個諗法純粹因為舊所以係錯嘅[13],好似係以下呢場討論噉:

A 君:都成廿一世紀啦,仲信耶穌 2,000 年前教嗰套?你老唔老土啲呀?
B 君:舊嘅觀念唔一定係錯嘅,例如牛頓力學呢套物理學理論有成 500 年歷史,但係到咗今日都仲好啱用,喺好多工程學領域嗰度都好有價值。相比之下,19 世紀弗洛伊德所創嗰套精神分析理論俾心理學界插到乜噉,家陣經已冇心理學家會當佢係一回事。由此可見,舊嘅觀念唔一定錯。

細分類 編輯

唔啦更謬論仲有得細分做好多唔同種[5]

偽冒論題
  • 草人謬論:攻擊同對方嘅論述冇關嘅論點。
  • 偽冒論題:提出同爭議重點唔啦更,但係就噉睇似有關嘅言論。
  • 我有權發表意見:喺自己個論點俾人批評嗰陣,主張「我有權利發表意見」,所以「你唔可以批評我講嘅嘢」,但係事實上一個人係咪有權發表意見同佢個意見係咪可取係兩樣嘢。
偽冒理據

參考書 編輯

  • 李天命,《哲道行者(最終定本)》,2009. ISBN 9789888026371.
  • 李天命,《李天命的思考藝術(最終定本)》,2009.
  • 李天命,《殺悶思維(最終定本)》,2010. ISBN 9789888027866.
  • George Rainbolt, Sandra Dwyer. (2014). Critical Thinking: The Art of Argument. ISBN 9781285969749.

編輯

  1. Frans, van Eemeren; Bart, Garssen; Bert, Meuffels (2009). "1". Fallacies and judgements of reasonableness, Empirical Research Concerning the Pragma-Dialectical Discussion Rules. Dordrecht: Springer Science+Business Media B.V. p. 2.
  2. Bishop Whately, cited by John Stuart Mill: A System of Logic. London Colchester 1959 (first: 1843), pp. 542.
  3. Patrick J. Hurley (2011). A Concise Introduction to Logic. Cengage Learning. pp. 131–133.
  4. Liddell–Scott–Jones. A Greek-English Lexicon.
  5. 5.0 5.1 5.2 Charles Leonard Hamblin (1970). Fallacies. Methuen & Co. Ltd. p. 31.
  6. Christopher W. Tindale (2007). Fallacies and Argument Appraisal. Cambridge University Press. p. 34.
  7. Aristotle (1878). The Organon, or Logical treatises, of Aristotle. 2. Octavius Freire Owen (translation). Covent Garden: George Bell and Sons. pp. 548–553.
  8. "Ignoratio Elenchi 互聯網檔案館歸檔,歸檔日期2018年8月20號,.". Introduction to Logic.
  9. Davies, Arthur Ernest (1915). A Text-Book of Logic. R. G. Adams and company. pp. 569–576.
  10. Bagnall, Nicholas. Books: Paperbacks, The Sunday Telegraph.
  11. Boswell 1986, p. 122.
  12. Appeal to Tradition - Logically Fallacious.
  13. Appeal to Novelty - Logically Fallacious.